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1. Introduction 
Recently, corruption has become a major preoccupation among economists and 
policymakers.
1
 Previous studies have found that corruption curbs growth and investment (Mauro, 
1995), along with the provision of public services (Mauro, 1998), in addition to increasing 
inequality (Li et al., 2000). As a result, the World Bank has supported hundreds of anticorruption 
efforts developed by its member countries since 1996.
2
 Furthermore, in 2003, the General 
Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention against Corruption, which entered into force 
in December 2005, with the purpose of preventing and combating corruption.
3
 Clearly 
understanding the causes of corruption is important in developing ways to prevent it.  
A major problem that has allowed corruption to flourish in some countries is lack of 
accountability. Lederman et al. (2005), for example, find that greater political accountability, in 
the form of democracy and freedom of the press, reduce corruption. But corruption is not a 
phenomenon restricted to autocratic countries with a government-controlled press. In fact, 
although more democratic countries are less corrupt (see Treisman, 2000), there are still 
differences in the levels of corruption among those countries that have democratic systems. This 
paper, then, focuses on democratic countries to explore the effect of an increase in 
accountability, in the form of greater access to information, on corruption. 
Accountability, however, is not enough to curb corruption if citizens are unable to 
monitor officials. A free press is then essential to investigate and divulge abuses of power to the 
public, thus reducing the cost of obtaining information (see Djankov et al. (2003) and Brunetti 
                                                
1
 A search on Google Scholar for articles on corruption in 2006 yielded 258 articles or books with the word 
corruption in the title. 
2The World Bank’s Anti-Corruption Section.  
3 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_convention_corruption.html 
 3 
and Weder (2003), for instance).
4
 Nevertheless, there is only so much that a free press can do to 
observe the activities of politicians if there is no legislation providing citizens the right to access 
information. And if information on government behavior cannot be obtained, then elected 
officials will not have the threat of being voted out of office due to a misuse of public office as a 
deterrent. As a result, whether or not a country has a Freedom of Information (FOI) law can have 
an important impact on a country’s level of corruption. 
And yet even if the press is unbiased, greater transparency may not necessarily lead to 
lower corruption. Bac (2001) argues that greater transparency also leads to better information 
about whom to bribe. If the incentive to establish a connection with the relevant official is 
greater than the probability of detection, corruption may actually increase. Furthermore, Sutter 
(2006) finds that greater media scrutiny my actually decrease the quality of politicians, as it 
creates privacy and reputational costs. This means that an FOI law may not necessarily decrease 
corruption. 
The type of electoral system may also play a role in determining the impact of greater 
transparency on corruption. Persson and Tabellini (2003), for instance, find that proportional 
representation systems are more prone to corruption than majoritarian systems.
5
 This is because 
in majoritarian systems, voters are choosing among individual candidates, which creates an 
incentive for incumbents to perform well. In PR systems, on the other hand, voters are choosing 
among party lists, so that a politician’s chance of reelection is based not on performance, but on 
his or her rank on the list. Myerson (1993), on the other hand, moves away from this 
                                                
4
 A free press, however, does not mean an unbiased press. A biased press may report on corruption cases involving 
one party but not another. See Strömberg (2004), DellaVigna and Kaplan (2006), Besley and Prat (2006), and 
Larcinese et al. (2006) for details. 
5
 Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) reach the same conclusion with regards to PR systems being more corrupt 
than majoritarian systems. Unlike Persson and Tabellini, however, the authors find that presidential systems, 
especially in a closed list PR system, are more corrupt than parliamentary systems. 
 4 
transparency argument to suggest that plurality systems are more corrupt, since the resulting 
barriers to entry allow for corruption profits. In PR systems, on the other hand, competition 
drives corruption to zero. Other authors have found support for this barriers-to-entry argument, 
though in the context of district magnitude. In particular, Persson and Tabellini (2003), as well as 
Persson et al. (2003) find that the lower the district magnitude (defined as the number of seats 
per district), the higher is corruption. 
The type of executive also affects accountability. Lederman et al. (2005) argue that in 
presidential systems, the executive is more independent and hence less subject to accountability 
from the other branches of government. Their empirical analysis confirms that parliamentary 
systems are in fact associated with lower corruption levels. 
Several democratic countries have adopted an FOI law in the past decade, which provides 
for a natural experiment to address this issue. However, to my knowledge, no study has 
examined the effect of freedom of information laws on corruption. The closest is Islam (2006), 
who uses cross-sectional data to explore whether more transparency, in the form of greater 
information access, affects governance. She finds that countries with greater transparency, 
measured in one case as having FOI legislation, do have lower corruption. This paper, however, 
focuses on whether enacting an FOI law reduces corruption, rather than whether countries that 
have such legislation have lower corruption. In addition, I explore whether the effect on 
corruption takes place during the first five years of the law or only during subsequent years. 
Furthermore, because the type of electoral system, as well as the type of executive, seem to be 
important determinants of corruption among democratic countries, I also examine whether the 
effect of FOI legislation differs between plurality and proportional representation systems, as 
 5 
well as between presidential and parliamentary systems. Finally, since I rely on panel data, I am 
able to take care of possible spurious correlation through fixed effects. 
One of the difficulties in measuring corruption, however, lies in how to distinguish 
between corruption and rent-seeking. The World Bank defines corruption as the misuse of public 
office for private gain. As Tanzi (1998) points out, corruption can take many forms, and may not 
necessarily involve the payment of bribes.
6
 This paper uses the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) corruption index, which has been produced annually since 1982 by Political Risk 
Services, a private international investment risk service, as an indicator. This index, which 
measures corruption at all levels of government and bureaucracy, is based on the opinion of 
experts, and seeks to capture the extent to which “high government officials are likely to demand 
special payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected throughout low levels of 
government” in the form of “bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange 
controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans.”
7
 The sample, which is restricted to 
democratic countries, consists of an unbalanced panel
8
 of up to 70 countries from 1984 to 2005, 
34 of which enacted FOI legislation during the period (see Appendix 1). In addition, and as a 
robustness check, I also use Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index, which 
gives me a sample of up 72 democratic countries from 1995 to 2005, with 21 of them adopting 
an FOI law during the period. This allows me to use a difference-in-difference approach to 
examine the effects of the legislation on corruption, with the treatment effect being estimated 
only from within-country variation around the law. 
9
 
                                                
6
 It is also difficult distinguishing between a gift and a bribe (Tanzi, 1998). 
7
 http://www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods 
8
 It is an unbalanced panel because the ICRG index was not available for the entire period for some countries, and 
because some countries only came into existence later in the sample period. 
9
 It should be noted that the concern here is only whether or not a country passed an FOI law, not whether it is 
effective. However, as Islam (2006) points out, an FOI law is only one step a government takes to improve 
 6 
The results, described in section 4, indicate that adopting an FOI law resulted in an 
increase in corruption. Countries with plurality systems, however, experienced a decrease in 
corruption or at least a smaller increase than those with PR or mixed systems. The effect of the 
law on parliamentary systems did not seem to be much different from that in presidential 
systems. These results are robust to using different sets of control and treatment groups as a 
result of a different dependent variable, restricting the sample to very democratic countries, and 
including additional control variables. 
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the data, while 
section 3 presents the empirical specification. Section 4 examines the results and subjects them 
to a variety of sensitivity tests. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Data 
2.1. Corruption 
There exists no objective measure of corruption, so since Mauro (1995), a number of 
empirical studies have employed various subjective indices that attempt to measure the perceived 
levels of corruption in a country. One of these indices is the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) corruption index. The ICRG index provides an appraisal of corruption within the 
political system. It based on the opinion of experts, and aims to provide potential investors with 
an assessment of political risk.  
The index varies from 0 to 6, with higher values denoting less corruption. The data are a 
simple average of monthly indices, which makes it continuous between 0 and 6. For ease of 
                                                                                                                                                       
governance, and even then it is not the first step. As a result, the existence of such a law can be taken as an indicator 
that a country is moving towards allowing greater access to information. 
 7 
interpretation, I reverse the index and rescale it from 0 to 10 so that high values correspond to 
higher corruption levels.  
One advantage of the ICRG index over other available indices is the fact that it is 
available for a long time period and for a large sample of countries. It is also highly correlated to 
other indices that have been used in the literature (see Treisman, 2000, for more details), which 
suggests that they are consistent despite being a subjective rating. However, as Ades and di Tella 
(1999) point out, some of the disadvantages of using such subjective indices include the fact that 
the rankings may not be uniform, so that a change from a score of 3 to 4 is different from a 
change from 5 to 6. Finally, there have been arguments that such corruption perception indices 
are more a measure of institutional quality than actual corruption. Mocan (2004), for instance, 
uses the United Nation’s International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) to construct a measure of 
actual corruption. After controlling for institutional quality, he finds that the extent of actual 
corruption does not have a significant effect on perceptions of corruption. The ICVS survey, 
however, only asks a sample of households whether “any government official asked or expected 
a bribe for services.”
10
 The ICRG index, on the other hand, is more concerned with “actual or 
potential corruption in form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, favor-for-favors, 
secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business,” in addition to 
financial corruption.
 11
 Clearly the question asked by the ICVS survey does not address these 
forms of corruption. Furthermore, given that such indices are used by banks and multinationals 
in making investment decisions, they are important in predicting a country’s economic 
performance. 
                                                
10
 http://www.unicri.it/icvs  
11
 http://www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods 
 8 
As a robustness check, I also experiment with Transparency International’s corruption 
perceptions index (CPI).
12
 The CPI is available starting in 1995 and until 2006, but country 
coverage varies by year. This index is a composite of other indices assessing corruption among 
public officials and politicians. One problem with the CPI is that year-to-year variations could 
result from changes in corruption perception, but also from changes in the sample of surveys 
included, as well the methodology used to construct the index. This means that it is difficult to 
say whether changes in score reflect changes in real levels of corruption, or the addition of new 
data or methodological differences. 
The sample of countries included in the analysis, shown in Appendix 1, is restricted to 
include only democracies for which I could obtain scores. They include countries that already 
had an FOI law, those that adopted one, and those that never adopted one in the 1984-2005 
period (in the case where corruption is measured using the ICRG index) or in the 1995-2005 
period (when corruption is measured using the CPI).
13
  
 
2.2. Freedom of Information Act 
Information on when countries adopted Freedom of Information laws is taken from 
Banisar (2006), who provides a description of the legislation in different countries. From this I 
construct an indicator that equals 1 starting on the year a country enacted an FOI law. Some 
countries passed an FOI legislation in one year, only to pass another many years later to replace 
the previous one. For instance, the Netherlands first adopted an FOI law in 1978, only to replace 
it in 1991 with the Government Information (Public Access) Act. The Philippines, for its part, 
does not have an FOI Act per se, but it was included in the 1973 Constitution, only to be 
                                                
12 See http://www.transparency.org 
13
 Note that country fixed effects can capture whether a country always had an FOI law during the period or not. 
 9 
expanded in the 1987 Constitution. In these cases, I take the year of adoption as the first year in 
which the country enacted legislation providing citizens the right to information. Appendix 1 
lists the different laws and years of adoption. 
 
2.3. Electoral System 
The indicators for a country’s electoral system, as well as for whether a country has a 
presidential or parliamentary system, are taken from the World Bank’s Database on Political 
Institutions (DPI2004), as described by Keefer (2005). The database contains data on the type of 
system from 1976 to 2004. The variable PLURALITY takes a value of 1 if legislators are elected 
using a winner-take-all or first past the post rule and 0 if it is not. The variable is further coded 
NA if “there is no competition for seats in a one-party state or if legislators are appointed” and is 
left blank “if it is unclear whether there is competition in a one-party state.” The variable PR, for 
its part, has a value of 1 if the country has a proportional representation system, and 0 otherwise, 
unless there is only one party, one candidate, the legislature is not elected, or there is no 
legislature, in which case the variable takes a value of NA. 
 From these indicators, I constructed the measure ELECSYS.14 This variable takes a value 
of 1 if the country has a plurality system and 0 if it has a PR or mixed system. 
In addition, the variable SYSTEM in the DPI2004 dataset distinguishes between direct 
presidential systems, strong president elected by assembly, and parliamentary system. From this 
                                                
14
 Because of inconsistencies in the DPI2004 dataset, I changed the index in the following cases, as the electoral rule 
given did not match that in Reynolds et al. (2005): Chile (plurality in the DPI2004 dataset, changed to PR), and 
Czech Republic and Guatemala (mixed in the DPI2004, changed to PR). I also coded the electoral system for 
Nigeria, as the DPI2004 dataset included data on district magnitude but not on the electoral system. 
 10 
I generate the dummy variable PARLIAMENT, which takes a value of 1 if the country has a 
parliamentary system and 0 if it is a presidential system.
15
 
 
2.4. Control 
The POLITY2 indicator is taken from the POLITY IV database, which is currently 
available up to 2004.
16
 The variable POLITY2 is a modified version of POLITY, which codes 
transition years so as to detect changes in regime. The POLITY variable, for its part, is a measure 
of the quality of democratic institutions, and varies from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 
(strongly autocratic). The sample is restricted to solely democratic countries, which are defined 
as having a strictly positive POLITY2 score. Still, because the degree of democracy varies from 
one country to another, and because the level of democracy can be taken as a proxy for press 
freedom,
17
 I include the POLITY2 index in all regressions as a control. 
 
3. Empirical Specification 
3.1. Methodology 
The effect of adopting a Freedom of Information (FOI) law is estimated using a 
difference-in-difference (DID) approach. In DID estimation, the outcome—in this case, the 
perceived level of corruption—is compared between two groups before and after a policy 
change—here enacting an FOI law. One group, denoted the “control,” consists of countries that 
                                                
15
 Presidential systems include both direct presidential system and those with a strong president elected by an 
assembly. 
16
 See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm.  
17
 An indicator for freedom of the press is available from Freedom House. The data are available from 1980-2006. 
However, it is only available as a numeric index starting in 1994; in previous years, it was available only as a 
designation of free, partly free, or not free. See http://www.freedomhouse.org. The correlation between the 
POLITY2 index and the freedom of the press index is 0.6248. In addition, little statistical difference in press 
freedom was found between the countries that adopted an FOI law and those that did not in the CPI sample. Finally, 
including the freedom of the press index as a control does not alter the results. 
 11 
have not undergone reform. The other group, the “treatment,” in turn includes the countries that 
have adopted an FOI law during the period. If the two groups are very similar, then any 
difference in outcome can be attributed to the causal effect of the treatment. This means that the 
effect of the law on corruption is then estimated from the difference in outcomes for these two 
groups (Meyer, 1995). An advantage of DID is that it takes care of all unobserved exogenous 
factors that exist before and after reform, as well as unobserved endogenous factors for each 
country in the sample if they are fixed before and after the reform in question. 
Simply comparing countries that underwent reform with those that did not, however, is 
problematic. For example, the set of countries that enacted FOI legislation may have been 
structurally different in various ways, such as culture, institutional arrangements, or 
constitutional tradition. Furthermore, there could be general trends that affect all countries in a 
similar way. If these unobserved heterogeneities are not taken into account, they could bias the 
results. Based on previous empirical studies on the causes of corruption, it is plausible to assume 
that these omitted effects are fixed in nature, rather than the outcome of a random draw.
18
 
Because the unobservables may contain a cross-sectional as well as a temporal dimension, I 
include both country- and year-specific fixed effects in the estimated equation. This means that 
identification is obtained out of within group variation.  
The estimated equation is of the form  
CORRit = !0 + !1FOIit + !2Democracyit +"i +# t +$it        (1) 
where 
! 
CORR
it
 is the ICRG or CPI corruption index for country i at time t; FOI
it
 is an indicator 
for whether country i adopted an FOI law during time t; Democracyit is the POLITY2 index; 
! 
"
i
 
                                                
18
 Some of the variables that have been used in cross-sectional studies of corruption include ethnolinguistic division, 
an indicator for colonial origin, an indicator for legal system origin, and an indicator for federalism. See Treisman 
(2000). 
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captures the country-level fixed effects, which are assumed constant over time; 
! 
"
t
 is the year-
specific fixed effect, which is assumed constant across countries and which allows me to obtain 
difference-in-difference estimates; and 
! 
"
it
 is the unobserved error term.
19
 The coefficient of 
interest is !
1
,which measures the impact of enacting FOI legislation. Because there could be a 
difference in the impact of an FOI law between very democratic countries and those that are not 
very democratic, I also experiment with including solely those countries that have a POLITY2 
score of 6 or higher.  
I further distinguish between the effect of the law during the first five years of adoption 
and subsequent years. The equation estimated in that case is 
CORRit = !0 + !1NEW _FOI _5it + !2EST _FOI _5it + !3Democracyit +"i +# t +$it  (2) 
where NEW _FOI _5
it
 equals 1 in the first 5 years of passing an FOI law, and EST _FOI _5
it
 
equals 1 after 5 years of adoption. The other variables are as defined above. Here the coefficients 
of interest are !
1
 and !
2
, with !
1
+!
2
 indicating the overall effect of the reform. To allow for 
the fact reforms may take longer to have an impact on corruption due to the time lag before 
citizens become fully aware of the law, I also estimate, in the case of the ICRG sample, the 
equation 
CORRit = !0 + !1NEW _FOI _10it + !2EST _FOI _10it + !3Democracyit +"i +# t +$it  (3) 
where NEW _FOI _10
it
 equals 1 in the first 10 years of passing an FOI law, and 
EST _FOI _10
it
 equals 1 after 10 years of adoption.
20
 The other variables are as defined above.  
The fourth estimated equation explores whether the electoral system of a country has an 
impact on the effect of enacting FOI legislation. In particular, 
                                                
19
 Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent unless otherwise specified. More detailed is provided in the next 
section. 
20
 Equation (3) is not estimated for the CPI sample because less than 10 years of data are available. 
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CORRit = !0 + !1FOIit + !2FOIit *ELECSYSit + !3Democracyit +"i +# t +$it   (4) 
where FOI
it
*ELECSYS
it
denotes the interaction between the FOI indicator and the type of 
electoral system and other variables are as defined above. Here !
1
 denotes the effect of reform in 
PR and mixed systems, while !
1
+!
2
 is the effect of the reform in plurality systems. An equation 
similar to (2), examining the effect of newly adopting an FOI law versus having an FOI law for 
more than 5 years, is also estimated. 
Finally, I estimate whether the effect of the law on corruption differs in presidential 
versus parliamentary systems. The estimated equation in this case is 
CORRit = !0 + !1FOIit + !2FOIit *PARLIAMit + !3Democracyit +"i +# t +$it   (5) 
where FOI
it
*PARLIAM
it
is the interaction between the FOI indicator and an indicator for 
whether the country has a parliamentary or presidential system. The coefficient !
1
 denotes the 
effect of reform in presidential systems, while !
1
+!
2
 is the effect of the reform in parliamentary 
systems. Other variables are as defined above. As in the case of the electoral system, an equation 
similar to (2) is also estimated. 
Because there could also be factors that evolve over time in different ways across 
countries, I also experiment with including the time-varying and country-specific determinants of 
corruption that appeared to differ between the treatment and control group according to Table 1 
as a robustness check.
 
 
Countries are defined as “treated” only if they adopted an FOI law during the period 
under consideration. More specifically, “treated” countries are the ones that enacted the 
legislation in the period starting from one year following the start of the sample and ending three 
 14 
years before the end of the sample.
21
 This is to allow for the delay between adoption and its 
effect on perceptions of corruption.  
 
3.2. Identification 
With DID estimation, a crucial identifying assumption is that there is no unobserved 
variable affecting corruption that moves systematically over time in different ways between the 
groups of countries that underwent reform and those that did not (see Besley and Case, 2000). 
This means that the two groups of countries must be similar to each other, so that any omitted 
variable that varies across time, such as increased globalization, cannot affect the control and 
treated countries differently. In other words, the only difference between the two groups of 
countries must be the fact that one of them underwent reform and the other did not.  
Another factor that could cause the identifying assumption to be violated is if how 
countries are assigned to the treatment or control group is endogenous, so that the decision to 
adopt an FOI law is dependent on the level of corruption. This potentially could be the case here. 
As Banisar (2006) notes, such laws were often adopted as a result of corruption scandals. But 
this was the case mostly in long established democracies. For instance, in the U.S., the FOI Act 
only became far-reaching when it was revised in 1974 following Watergate. Similarly, Ireland 
passed an FOI law in 1997 as a result of a public outcry over the management of a public blood 
bank and the conditions in the meatpacking industry. In newer democracies, however, laws were 
adopted due to the demand for more open and democratic governments that resulted from the 
collapse of totalitarian governments, as well as the influence of international organizations. 
Hungary passed an FOI law in 1992 to make the previous communist regime accountable. 
Similarly, as a result of its experience under apartheid, South Africa included in its 1994 
                                                
21
 The choice of starting point and cutoff does not affect the results. 
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constitution a provision guaranteeing the access to government information to its citizens. 
Finally, Estonia, Lithania, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, all adopted FOI legislation at the behest of the OECD.  (Blanton, 2002). 
Table 1, then, compares characteristics that have been used to explain corruption levels in 
the literature across countries that enacted FOI legislation versus those that did not, using the 
ICRG and the CPI samples. These variables are the size of the government, which is measured as 
total government expenditures as a fraction of GDP (World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators); the log of GDP per capita (World Development Indicators); secondary school 
enrollment (World Development Indicators); fuel exports as a percentage of total exports (World 
Development Indicators), the log of population (World Development Indicators); ethnic 
fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003); and a freedom of the press indicator (Freedom House). 
Tests of means do reveal some statistical difference between the two groups in both the ICRG 
and CPI samples, and in particular in the log of population, log of GDP per capita, and secondary 
school enrollment, in the case of the ICRG index; and freedom of the press in the case of the 
CPI. This means that additional tests must be taken to ensure the casual interpretation of the 
results. Furthermore, corruption, as measured by the ICRG index or CPI, differs between the two 
groups, but not initial corruption. This suggests that countries with more corruption are no more 
likely to adopt FOI laws. To further check the similarity of the groups, Appendix 2 compares the 
estimated probability of adopting an FOI law, conditional upon being in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
 16 
America,
22
 the so-called propensity score, for the control and treatment groups. Tests of means 
using either the ICRG sample or the CPI sample show no difference between the two groups.
23
 
The fact that the control group includes countries that had an FOI law during the period 
under consideration helps ensure that the control and treatment countries are not much different 
on average. However, to further address these issues, the robustness of the results is examined in 
various ways. Firstly, as mentioned above, I experiment with using a different dependent 
variable, Transparency International’s CPI index. Because the coverage varies, both in number 
of countries and years available, it allows me to test whether results hold with a different set of 
control and treatment countries. Secondly, I include an interaction term between year fixed 
effects and time-invariant indices classifying a country according to its region (Asia, Africa, 
Latin America). This again would make the different groups of countries more similar.  
Finally, I add the time-varying control variables that have been used in the literature to 
explain corruption levels, and which were found to differ in some cases across groups. This 
further helps ensure that the control and various treatment groups are as similar as possible. 
These variables are, again, the log of population, the log of GDP per capita, secondary school 
enrollment, and the POLITY2 index. In the case of the CPI sample, I include the POLITY2 
index and the freedom of the press indicator. The log of GDP per capita is included as a measure 
of economic development. More developed countries have been found to have lower corruption 
                                                
22
 I include only these regions because the most corrupt countries fall in these regions. On average, countries in 
Latin America and Caribbean have an ICRG score of 3.3, Africa 2.2, and Asia 2.77. In the meantime the average 
score for European countries is 1.56 and for North America (which here includes only the U.S. and Canada, since 
Mexico is classified as part of Latin America) is 0.78. 
23
 When the full sample is used, substantial differences are found between the control and treatment group. 
Furthermore, it was found that no low income countries (as defined by the OECD) adopted FOI legislation. As a 
result, I have dropped all low income countries from both samples. In addition, in the case of the ICRG sample, I 
found that even after removing the low income countries, the estimated probability of adopting an FOI law (the 
propensity score) differed between the control and treatment groups. As a result, I systematically dropped countries 
from the sample until I could not reject the hypothesis that the propensity score was the same between the control 
and treatment groups. The country ultimately dropped from the ICRG sample was Guatemala. Results, however, are 
not sensitive to the presence of Guatemala in the sample. 
 17 
levels (see Treisman, 2000, for instance). As for secondary school enrollment, countries with 
lower education levels are predicted to be more corrupt, as less educated people may not have 
much understanding of government process (see Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Finally, Ades and 
Wacziarg (1997) argue that large countries have smaller ratios of public service outlets per capita 
as a result of economies of scale in the provision of public services, so that individuals may 
resort to bribes in order to obtain service.
24
 Fisman and Gatti (2002) also find that corruption is 
more widespread in larger countries. Knack and Azfar (2003), on the other hand, find that 
sample selection bias drives this result that smaller countries are less corrupt, as most of the 
available corruption perception indices include only small countries with good governance. 
When more countries are included in the sample, the relationship disappears. They also point out 
that due to the breadth of coverage, the ICRG index is less subject to this bias. 
A final consideration regards the possible presence of positive serial correlation, which is 
common in DID estimation (see Bertrand et al., 2004). Positive serial correlation would not bias 
the estimated treatment effect, but it could cause standard errors to be understated. This is of 
particular concern in this case, as the corruption measure moves slowly over time. To correct this 
problem, I follow Bertrand et al. (2004), and estimate the regressions allowing residuals to be 
correlated within each country. 
 
4. Results 
Results are presented in Tables 2-10. All regressions include country and year fixed 
effects. Furthermore, in all cases, heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are adjusted by 
clustering by country. Tables 2-4 present the results examining the effects of enacting an FOI 
law on corruption. Tables 5-7 look at whether the effect of the FOI law varies depending on the 
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 Graeff and Mehlkop (2003), however, find that bigger governments are less corrupt. 
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type of electoral system, while Tables 8-10 explore whether FOI laws have different effects on 
corruption depending on whether the country has a presidential or parliamentary system. 
 
4.1. FOI Law and Corruption 
Tables 2-4 present the results examining the effects of enacting an FOI law on corruption. 
In Table 2, the overall effect of the legislation is estimated; in Table 3, I test whether the impact 
of the legislation in the first five years differs from its effect in subsequent years. Table 4 
includes further control variables to check for the robustness of the results. 
In all cases, it is seen that adopting an FOI law increases corruption. The result is robust 
regardless of the dependent variable. In Table 2, enacting such legislation increases corruption, 
whereas democracy has mostly an insignificant impact on corruption. The coefficient on FOI 
indicates that passing an FOI law increases the ICRG index by about 0.6-0.7 points, and the CPI 
index by 0.3 points. Table 3 suggests that this increase in corruption takes place in the first five 
years of adoption, as the coefficient on EST_FOI_5, which measures the effect of the law after 
the first five years of adoption, is mostly insignificant. Passing such legislation is estimated to 
increase the ICRG index by about 0.7 points in the first five years, and the CPI index by 0.3 
points. A similar result is found when examining the impact of the reform in the first 10 years 
and in subsequent years. In particular, passing an FOI law increases corruption as measured by 
the ICRG index by 0.6-0.7 points.  
Adding further controls in Table 4 to reduce the differences between the control and 
treatment groups does not change the conclusions. In particular, results suggest that passing an 
FOI law again raises the ICRG index by 0.6 points, and the CPI by 0.3 points with this increase 
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taking place in the first five, as well as the first ten years. The effect of the law on subsequent 
years, however, is insignificant, as are all the control variables.  
 
4.2. FOI Law, Electoral System, and Corruption 
Tables 5-7 explore whether the impact of an FOI law varies depending on the type of 
electoral system. Table 5 presents the baseline results, where the overall effect of the legislation 
is estimated, with an additional indicator to capture whether the impact of the law differs if the 
country has a plurality system. In Table 6, I test for whether the impact of the reform is in the 
first five years only or whether it continues on into subsequent years. Table 7 includes further 
control variables to check for the robustness of the results. 
Table 5 shows that passing an FOI law increases corruption in PR and mixed systems. 
However, the coefficient on FOI*ELECSYS indicates that countries with a plurality system that 
enact this type of legislation may actually experience a decline in corruption, or at least a much 
smaller increase. The effect of the law in PR and mixed systems is to increase the ICRG index by 
0.6-0.8 points and the CPI by 0.3-0.4 points. Plurality systems, however, have a decline of about 
0.1 points in the ICRG scale, and an increase of 0.1 points in the CPI. Furthermore, more 
democratic countries have lower corruption, as expected, though again only in column 2.  
Table 6 suggests that this increase in corruption in PR and mixed systems takes place 
mostly in the first five years of adoption, with the effect carrying on to subsequent years. The 
conclusions, however, are unchanged. Enacting FOI legislation raises corruption both in the first 
five years, as well as in subsequent years, regardless of how corruption is measured. However, in 
countries with plurality systems, the effect of the FOI law is to reduce the ICRG index in the first 
five years, with a smaller increase in subsequent years. On the other hand, the law seems to 
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increase the CPI index by a smaller margin during the first 5 years, only to decrease in 
subsequent years.  
Finally, adding further controls in Table 7 does not alter the conclusions. In particular, 
results suggest that passing an FOI law again raises corruption, but potentially lowers it in 
countries with plurality systems, or at least results in a smaller increase. When comparing new 
versus established reforms in columns 3-4 and 7-8, it is seen that the increase in corruption in PR 
and mixed systems takes place both within the first five years and in subsequent years. However, 
in countries with plurality systems, new reforms reduce the ICRG index, while increasing the 
CPI index, although by less than in PR and mixed systems. Having enacted the law for more than 
5 years does reduce the CPI index in plurality systems, as before. 
 
4.3. FOI Law, Parliamentary Systems, and Corruption 
Tables 8-10 examine whether having a parliamentary or presidential system affects the 
impact of an FOI law on corruption. Table 8 presents the overall effect of the legislation, along 
with its impact on parliamentary systems; in Table 9, I test whether the impact of the legislation 
in the first five years differs from its effect in subsequent years. Table 10 includes further control 
variables to check for the robustness of the results. 
According to Table 8, passing an FOI law increases corruption in presidential systems, 
regardless of which index is used to measure it. In the case of parliamentary systems, however, 
the effect of the legislation is the same, as the coefficient on FOI*PARLIAM is insignificant, 
suggesting that the impact of an FOI law on corruption does not differ among presidential and 
parliamentary systems.  
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Table 9 suggests that the impact of the legislation when also taking into account whether 
the country had a parliamentary system is mostly insignificant when corruption is measured 
using the CPI. When the dependent variable is the ICRG index, however, it is seen that adopting 
an FOI law increases corruption in the first five years, followed by a further increase in the 
following years. Enacting this legislation in parliamentary systems, however, results in a smaller 
increase in corruption in subsequent years.  
As a further robustness check, Table 10 adds further control variables designed to make 
the control and treatment groups more similar. Here it is found that passing an FOI law still 
raises corruption. However, parliamentary systems experience a smaller increase in corruption as 
measured by the ICRG index. 
In sum, these results suggest that adopting an FOI law increases corruption, although 
countries with a plurality system are found to potentially experience a decrease in corruption. 
Having a parliamentary rather than a presidential system, however, does not change the effect of 
the law on corruption. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Corruption has recently become an issue of great concern, as it is believed to be a major 
obstacle preventing countries from developing. The problem of corruption has always been 
linked to a question of accountability. If politicians and other public officials are accountable for 
their behavior in office, so that there is a threat of being removed from office if they misbehave, 
then they have an incentive not to misuse their office for private gain. A democratic system is 
then fundamental in keeping politicians in check. Just as important, however, is transparency. If 
voters do not know that politicians are abusing their office, they cannot punish them at the polls. 
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A free press helps voters obtain such information. But in order for the press to monitor the 
government, it must be able to directly observe its actions. Freedom of Information legislation, 
then, serves to allow such access. 
This paper used the recent move towards adopting Freedom of Information Acts as a 
natural experiment to determine the casual impact of FOI legislation on corruption. Using two 
different measures of corruption, which allowed for different control and treatment groups, I 
found that countries that adopted an FOI law experienced an increase in corruption, with the 
increase taking place mostly in the first 5 years of the legislation. Plurality systems, however, 
saw a potential decrease in corruption, whereas there was little difference in the impact between 
presidential and parliamentary systems. Results were robust throughout different specifications.  
If adopting an FOI law does not decrease, but actually increases corruption, does this 
mean, then, that citizens should not be allowed to have access to government information? Not 
necessarily. Although the law provides for access to government information, there is still the 
problem of actually obtaining it, as disclosure comes at the discretion of the officials in charge of 
providing information. For instance, the FOI law in the UK makes no provision for a time limit 
in which officials need to consider a request. This has resulted in a backlog of over 1000 cases, 
so that it can take more than 12 months before a citizen is able to obtain information. In India, 
citizens need to pay a bribe in order to obtain access to government information (Banisar 2006). 
Furthermore, it could be that the full impact of these laws will not be known until many years 
later, as they are used more often and as the information is passed on to voters. For example, in 
Albania, the law is not used very often because neither government officials nor citizens are 
aware of its existence (Banisar 2006). However, when distinguishing the effect of new versus 
established reforms, it was still found that corruption became more widespread following the 
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passage of an FOI law. The results of this paper, then, suggest that the potential benefits of FOI 
laws are being marred by difficulties in actually obtaining information, which is allowing 
corruption to rise. This paper, however, also shows that the type of electoral system does have an 
impact on how effective this type of law is on curbing corruption. These effects then should be 
taken into account when designing strong FOI laws. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Control and Treatment Groups 
 ICRG Sample CPI Sample 
 Control Treatment Difference Control Treatment Difference 
ICRG Corruption Index 3.626 3.932 -0.306    
 (2.485) (2.015) (0.127)    
obs 654 599     
1984 ICRG Corruption Index 2.544 3.151 -0.607    
 (2.894) (2.306) (0.849)    
obs 19 19     
CPI Corruption Index    4.559 5.274 -0.715*** 
    (2.509) (1.732) (0.176) 
obs    432 182  
1996 CPI Corruption Index    3.853 4.377 -0.524 
    (2.467) (2.056) (0.766) 
obs    30 11  
Polity2 8.239 8.613 -0.374*** 8.595 8.533 0.062 
 (2.006) (1.971) (0.112) (1.778) (1.792) (0.158) 
obs 654 599  432 182  
Log of Population 16.243 16.468 -0.226*** 16.433 16.575 -0.142 
 (1.461) (1.256) (0.077) (1.365) (1.377) (0.122) 
obs 640 599  422 182  
Log GDP per capita 1.591 1.839 -0.248*** 1.807 1.688 0.119 
 (1.300) (0.987) (0.065) (1.236) (0.965) (0.094) 
obs 639 598  421 182  
Secondary School Enrollment 80.324 88.669 -8.345*** 93.358 93.934 -0.576 
 (29.116) (22.577) (1.516) (25.968) (19.238) (2.047) 
obs 604 569  362 159  
Size of Government 0.164 0.165 -0.001 0.166 0.168 -0.003 
 (0.064) (0.055) (0.003) (0.060) (0.053) (0.005) 
obs 616 581  386 174  
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.380 0.317 0.063 28.984 32.819 -3.835 
 (0.230) (0.210) (0.053) (17.508) (26.399) (2.130) 
obs 36 34  432 182  
Free Press 29.353 30.765 -1.413 0.353 0.339 0.014* 
 (17.841) (21.590) (1.430) (0.225) (0.195) (0.053) 
obs 397 375  51 21  
Note: Control and Treatment columns present the mean of each variable. The column labeled Difference presents the differences 
of means. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The ICRG corruption perception index varies from 0 (least corrupt) to 6 (most 
corrupt), whereas the CPI corruption index varies from 0 (least corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt). The log of population, log of GDP 
per capita, secondary school enrollment, and size of government are taken from the World Development Indicators. The size of 
government is general government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Ethnic fractionalization measures the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country belonged to different groups. This was taken from Alesina et al. 
(2003). Free press is an indicator for freedom of the press, from Freedom House. 
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Table 2: Effects of Adopting an FOI Law on Corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG CPI CPI CPI CPI 
FOI 0.697** 0.580** 0.659** 0.512* 0.312*** 0.273*** 0.350*** 0.313*** 
 (0.268) (0.251) (0.280) (0.266) (0.092) (0.094) (0.092) (0.093) 
Democracy -0.039 -0.080 -0.064 -0.118 -0.010 -0.007 -0.126*** -0.084* 
 (0.068) (0.057) (0.107) (0.099) (0.050) (0.048) (0.038) (0.046) 
Region-Year Interaction?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1253 1253 1136 1136 611 611 579 579 
R-squared (within) 0.3382 0.4399 0.3384 0.4378 0.0665 0.1699 0.0930 0.1965 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, clustered by country, are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Region-Year Interaction refers to the 
interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In columns 1-4, the 
dependent variable is the ICRG corruption perception index. In columns 5-8, the dependent variable is Transparency 
International’s corruption perception index. In columns 1-2 and 5-6, the sample includes all countries with a positive POLITY2 
score; in columns 3-4 and 7-8, only those countries that scored in the 6-10 range of the POLITY2 scale are included. The FOI 
dummy equals 1 if country adopted an FOI law. Democracy refers to the POLITY2 index. Regressions where the CPI is the 
dependent variable are weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with the index. 
 
 
Table 3: Effects of New versus Established FOI Law on Corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG CPI CPI 
NEW_FOI_5 0.707** 0.627**   0.312*** 0.273*** 
 (0.274) (0.253)   (0.091) (0.093) 
EST_FOI_5 0.661** 0.381   0.302 0.275 
 (0.310) (0.318)   (0.193) (0.198) 
NEW_FOI_10   0.698** 0.579**   
   (0.269) (0.251)   
EST_FOI_10   0.766** 0.453   
   (0.369) (0.424)   
Democracy -0.039 -0.081 -0.038 -0.081 -0.010 -0.007 
 (0.067) (0.057) (0.068) (0.057) (0.050) (0.048) 
Region-Year Interaction?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1253 1253 1253 1253 611 611 
R-Squared (within) 0.3382 0.4416 0.3383 0.4402 0.0665 0.1699 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, clustered by country, are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Region-Year Interaction refers to the 
interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In columns 1-4, the 
dependent variable is the ICRG corruption perception index. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is Transparency 
International’s corruption perception index. NEW_FOI_5 equals 1 during the first 5 years a country adopted an FOI law. 
EST_FOI_5 equals 1 after the first 5 years of a country adopting an FOI law. NEW_FOI_10 equals 1 during the first 10 years a 
country adopted an FOI law. EST_FOI_10 equals 1 after the first 10 years of a country adopting an FOI law. Democracy refers to 
the POLITY2 index. Regressions where the CPI is the dependent variable are weighted by the inverse of the variance associated 
with the index. 
Table 4: Robustness Check, Effects of Adopting FOI Law on Corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG CPI CPI CPI CPI 
FOI 0.640** 0.597**     0.316*** 0.280***   
 (0.296) (0.285)     (0.092) (0.094)   
NEW_FOI_5   0.667** 0.648**     0.317*** 0.280*** 
   (0.298) (0.285)     (0.091) (0.092) 
EST_FOI_5   0.460 0.283     0.283 0.253 
   (0.372) (0.385)     (0.202) (0.207) 
NEW_FOI_10     0.640** 0.595**     
     (0.298) (0.286)     
EST_FOI_10     0.647 0.467     
     (0.426) (0.481)     
Democracy -0.047 -0.087 -0.049 -0.089 -0.047 -0.088 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.075) (0.063) (0.075) (0.064) (0.075) (0.064) (0.050) (0.047) (0.050) (0.047) 
Log of Population -1.425 0.822 -1.591 0.760 -1.421 0.799     
 (1.803) (2.391) (1.827) (2.406) (1.860) (2.397)     
Log GDP per Capita -0.094 -0.004 -0.078 0.043 -0.093 -0.017     
 (1.025) (0.905) (1.030) (0.906) (1.025) (0.898)     
Secondary School Enrollment -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002     
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)     
Free Press       0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
       (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Region-Year Interaction?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1172 1172 1172 1172 1172 1172 611 611 611 611 
R-Squared (within) 0.3203 0.4220 0.3214 0.4254 0.3203 0.4222 0.0692 0.1729 0.0693 0.1717 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, clustered by country, are in parenthesis. Dependent variable is the ICRG corruption perception index. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Region-Year Interaction refers to the interaction between the year fixed effects and 
dummy variables for Asia, Africa, and Latin America. FOI equals 1 if a country adopted an FOI law. NEW_FOI_5 equals 1 during the first 5 years a country adopted an FOI law. 
EST_FOI_5 equals 1 after the first 5 years of a country adopting an FOI law. NEW_FOI_10 equals 1 during the first 10 years a country adopted an FOI law. EST_FOI_10 equals 1 
after the first 10 years of a country adopting an FOI law. In columns 1-6, the dependent variable is the ICRG index; in columns 7-10, it is the CPI index. Democracy refers to the 
POLITY2 index. The log of population, log of GDP per capita, secondary school enrollment, and log of population are taken from the World Development Indicators. Free press is 
an indicator for freedom of the press, from Freedom House. Regressions where the CPI is the dependent variable are weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with the 
index. 
 
Table 5: Effect of Adopting FOI Law on Corruption, Distinguishing Electoral System 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG CPI CPI CPI CPI 
FOI 0.789*** 0.630** 0.804** 0.638** 0.362*** 0.313*** 0.414*** 0.359*** 
 (0.292) (0.273) (0.304) (0.290) (0.106) (0.106) (0.103) (0.102) 
FOI*ELECSYS -0.696 -0.330 -0.902** -0.712** -0.256** -0.196 -0.302** -0.216 
 (0.455) (0.401) (0.353) (0.312) (0.121) (0.142) (0.114) (0.148) 
Democracy -0.040 -0.088 -0.098 -0.150 -0.018 -0.014 -0.142*** -0.102** 
 (0.075) (0.060) (0.105) (0.096) (0.051) (0.048) (0.036) (0.044) 
Region-Year Interaction?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1238 1238 1126 1126 607 607 575 575 
R-Squared (within) 0.3455 0.4450 0.3478 0.4453 0.0719 0.1725 0.1043 0.2023 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, clustered by country, are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Region-Year Interaction refers to the 
interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In columns 1-4, the 
dependent variable is the ICRG corruption perception index. In columns 5-8, the dependent variable is Transparency 
International’s corruption perception index. FOI dummy equals 1 if country adopted an FOI law. FOI*ELECSYS equals 1 if the 
country adopted an FOI law and had a plurality system. In columns 1-2 and 5-6, the sample includes all countries with a positive 
POLITY2 score; in columns 3-4 and 7-8, only those countries that scored in the 6-10 range of the POLITY2 scale are included. 
Democracy refers to the POLITY2 index. Regressions where the CPI is the dependent variable are weighted by the inverse of the 
variance associated with the index. 
 
Table 6: Effect of New versus Established FOI Law on Corruption, Distinguishing 
Electoral System 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG CPI CPI CPI CPI 
NEW_FOI_5 0.830*** 0.708** 0.832** 0.704** 0.354*** 0.305*** 0.406*** 0.352*** 
 (0.301) (0.277) (0.315) (0.297) (0.103) (0.102) (0.099) (0.096) 
EST_FOI_5 0.685** 0.377 0.731** 0.426 0.456* 0.403 0.508** 0.437 
 (0.323) (0.333) (0.337) (0.345) (0.241) (0.267) (0.248) (0.270) 
NEW_FOISYS_5 -0.886* -0.559 -1.023** -0.882** -0.231** -0.173 -0.277** -0.190 
 (0.452) (0.402) (0.386) (0.365) (0.115) (0.142) (0.107) (0.147) 
EST_FOISYS_5 -0.087 0.404 -0.456 -0.146 -0.522** -0.417 -0.567** -0.447 
 (0.435) (0.438) (0.331) (0.364) (0.260) (0.296) (0.266) (0.305) 
Democracy -0.045 -0.094 -0.100 -0.154 -0.017 -0.013 -0.143*** -0.103** 
 (0.074) (0.059) (0.105) (0.096) (0.051) (0.048) (0.036) (0.044) 
Region-Year Interaction?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1238 1238 1126 1126 607 607 575 575 
R-Squared (within) 0.3472 0.4489 0.3488 0.4481 0.0755 0.1748 0.1081 0.2050 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, clustered by country, are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Region-Year Interaction refers to the 
interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In columns 1-4, the 
dependent variable is the ICRG corruption perception index. In columns 5-8, the dependent variable is Transparency 
International’s corruption perception index. NEW_FOI_5 equals 1 during the first 5 years a country adopted an FOI law; 
NEW_FOISYS_5 equals 1 if NEW_FOI_5 equals 1 and the country has a plurality system. EST_FOI_5 equals 1 after the first 5 
years of a country adopting an FOI law; EST_FOISYS_5 equals 1 if EST_FOI_5 equals 1 and the country has a plurality system. 
In columns 1-2 and 5-6, the sample includes all countries with a positive POLITY2 score; in columns 3-4 and 7-8, only those 
countries that scored in the 6-10 range of the POLITY2 scale are included. Democracy refers to the POLITY2 index. Regressions 
where the CPI is the dependent variable are weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with the index. 
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Table 7: Robustness Check, Effect of Adopting FOI Law on Corruption, Distinguishing 
Electoral System 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG CPI CPI CPI CPI 
FOI 0.738** 0.636**   0.366*** 0.321***   
 (0.316) (0.296)   (0.106) (0.106)   
FOI*ELECSYS -0.684 -0.277   -0.260** -0.203   
 (0.504) (0.449)   (0.120) (0.142)   
NEW_FOI_5   0.799** 0.723**   0.360*** 0.313*** 
   (0.318) (0.297)   (0.102) (0.101) 
EST_FOI_5   0.480 0.271   0.465* 0.409 
   (0.386) (0.391)   (0.240) (0.268) 
NEW_FOISYS_5   -0.922* -0.516   -0.230** -0.172 
   (0.495) (0.455)   (0.112) (0.140) 
EST_FOISYS_5   0.230 0.720*   -0.602** -0.493 
   (0.479) (0.380)   (0.284) (0.314) 
Democracy -0.046 -0.093 -0.052 -0.101 -0.014 -0.010 -0.012 -0.009 
 (0.082) (0.066) (0.081) (0.066) (0.050) (0.048) (0.051) (0.048) 
Log of Population -1.233 0.759 -1.554 0.664     
 (1.820) (2.420) (1.858) (2.443)     
Log GDP per Capita 0.002 0.015 -0.038 0.015     
 (1.045) (0.932) (1.046) (0.924)     
Secondary School Enrollment -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001     
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)     
Free Press     0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002* 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Region-Year Interaction?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1161 1161 1161 1161 607 607 607 607 
R-Squared (within) 0.3240 0.4245 0.3282 0.4309 0.0738 0.1748 0.0795 0.1787 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, clustered by country, are in parenthesis. Dependent variable is the ICRG 
corruption perception index. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and 
time fixed effects. Region-Year Interaction refers to the interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. FOI dummy equals 1 if country adopted an FOI law. FOI*ELECSYS equals 1 if the country adopted 
an FOI law and had a plurality system. In columns 1-4, the dependent variable is the ICRG index; in columns 5-8, it is the CPI 
index. NEW_FOI_5 equals 1 during the first 5 years a country adopted an FOI law; NEW_FOISYS_5 equals 1 if NEW_FOI_5 
equals 1 and the country has a plurality system. EST_FOI_5 equals 1 after the first 5 years of a country adopting an FOI law; 
EST_FOISYS_5 equals 1 if EST_FOI_5 equals 1 and the country has a plurality system. Democracy refers to the POLITY2 
index. The log of population, log of GDP per capita, secondary school enrollment, and the log of population are taken from the 
World Development Indicators. Free press is an indicator for freedom of the press, from Freedom House. Regressions where the 
CPI is the dependent variable are weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with the index. 
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Table 8: Effect of Adopting FOI Law, 
Distinguishing Parliamentary vs. Presidential System 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG CPI CPI CPI CPI 
FOI 0.956** 0.917** 0.967** 0.985** 0.321*** 0.272** 0.375*** 0.322*** 
 (0.461) (0.402) (0.447) (0.417) (0.114) (0.120) (0.110) (0.117) 
FOI*PARLIAMENT -0.383 -0.500 -0.451 -0.682 -0.023 0.004 -0.058 -0.022 
 (0.510) (0.442) (0.485) (0.462) (0.155) (0.148) (0.149) (0.146) 
Democracy -0.049 -0.094 -0.103 -0.171* -0.010 -0.007 -0.128*** -0.085* 
 (0.064) (0.060) (0.105) (0.093) (0.050) (0.047) (0.037) (0.046) 
Region-Year Interaction?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1248 1248 1131 1131 611 611 579 579 
R-Squared (within) 0.3428 0.4489 0.3444 0.4508 0.0666 0.1699 0.0936 0.1966 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, clustered by country, are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Region-Year Interaction refers to the 
interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In columns 1-4, the 
dependent variable is the ICRG corruption perception index. In columns 5-8, the dependent variable is Transparency 
International’s corruption perception index. FOI dummy equals 1 if country adopted an FOI law; FOI*PARLIAMENT equals 1 if 
country adopted an FOI law and the country had a parliamentary system. In columns 1-2 and 5-6, the sample includes all 
countries with a positive POLITY2 score; in columns 3-4 and 7-8, only those countries that scored in the 6-10 range of the 
POLITY2 scale are included. Democracy refers to the POLITY2 index. Regressions where the CPI is the dependent variable are 
weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with the index. 
 
Table 9: Effect of New versus Established FOI Law,  
Distinguishing Parliamentary vs. Presidential System 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG CPI CPI CPI CPI 
NEW_FOI 0.899* 0.837** 0.909* 0.893** 0.315*** 0.271** 0.368*** 0.321*** 
 (0.482) (0.413) (0.471) (0.430) (0.109) (0.115) (0.102) (0.108) 
EST_FOI 1.247*** 1.306*** 1.292*** 1.475*** 0.465 0.299 0.517 0.333 
 (0.375) (0.395) (0.337) (0.368) (0.430) (0.484) (0.444) (0.490) 
NEW_FOIPAR -0.288 -0.312 -0.368 -0.489 -0.011 0.005 -0.046 -0.019 
 (0.542) (0.457) (0.526) (0.485) (0.150) (0.141) (0.142) (0.136) 
EST_FOIPAR -0.743* -1.186** -0.808** -1.422*** -0.229 -0.030 -0.258 -0.048 
 (0.412) (0.464) (0.351) (0.436) (0.456) (0.519) (0.468) (0.527) 
Democracy -0.050 -0.095 -0.105 -0.174* -0.010 -0.007 -0.128*** -0.086* 
 (0.064) (0.061) (0.105) (0.091) (0.050) (0.047) (0.037) (0.046) 
Region-Year Interaction?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1248 1248 1131 1131 611 611 579 579 
R-Squared (within) 0.3439 0.4538 0.3456 0.4560 0.0683 0.1699 0.0952 0.1966 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, clustered by country, are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects. Region-Year Interaction refers to the 
interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In columns 1-4, the 
dependent variable is the ICRG corruption perception index. In columns 5-8, the dependent variable is Transparency 
International’s corruption perception index. NEW_FOI equals 1 during the first 5 years a country adopted an FOI law; 
NEW_FOIPAR. EST_FOI equals 1 after the first 5 years of a country adopting an FOI law; EST_FOIPAR. In columns 1-2 and 
5-6, the sample includes all countries with a positive POLITY2 score; in columns 3-4 and 7-8, only those countries that scored in 
the 6-10 range of the POLITY2 scale are included. Democracy refers to the POLITY2 index. Regressions where the CPI is the 
dependent variable are weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with the index. 
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Table 10: Robustness Check, Effect of Adopting FOI Law, 
Distinguishing Parliamentary vs. Presidential System 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ICRG ICRG ICRG ICRG CPI CPI CPI CPI 
FOI 1.013** 0.943**   0.326*** 0.281**   
 (0.473) (0.413)   (0.114) (0.120)   
FOI*PARLIAMENT -0.571 -0.515   -0.024 -0.002   
 (0.540) (0.473)   (0.155) (0.147)   
NEW_FOI_5   0.972* 0.871**   0.319*** 0.280** 
   (0.501) (0.428)   (0.109) (0.114) 
EST_FOI_5   1.183*** 1.272***   0.472 0.306 
   (0.386) (0.451)   (0.430) (0.485) 
NEW_FOIPAR_5   -0.478 -0.334   -0.008 0.003 
   (0.568) (0.491)   (0.150) (0.140) 
EST_FOIPAR_5   -0.958* -1.249**   -0.264 -0.066 
   (0.497) (0.541)   (0.463) (0.526) 
Democracy -0.056 -0.099 -0.057 -0.101 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.073) (0.065) (0.074) (0.066) (0.049) (0.047) (0.050) (0.047) 
Log of population -1.919 0.513 -2.179 0.413     
 (1.801) (2.427) (1.885) (2.444)     
Log GDP per Capita -0.075 0.031 -0.080 0.039     
 (1.048) (0.929) (1.067) (0.940)     
Secondary School Enrollment -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001     
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)     
Free Press     0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Region-Year Interaction?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1171 1171 1171 1171 611 611 611 611 
R-Squared (within) 0.3245 0.4295 0.3264 0.4360 0.0693 0.1729 0.0717 0.1731 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, clustered by country, are in parenthesis. Dependent variable is the ICRG 
corruption perception index. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and 
time fixed effects. Region-Year Interaction refers to the interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. In columns 1-4, the dependent variable is the ICRG index; in columns 5-8, it is the CPI index. FOI 
dummy equals 1 if country adopted an FOI law; FOI*PARLIAMENT equals 1 if country adopted FOI law and had a 
parliamentary system. Democracy refers to the POLITY2 index. The log of  population, log of GDP per capita, secondary school 
enrollment, and the log of population are taken from the World Development Indicators. Free press is an indicator for freedom of 
the press, from Freedom House. Regressions where the CPI is the dependent variable are weighted by the inverse of the variance 
associated with the index. 
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Appendix 1: Control and Treated Countries, ICRG Index and CPI Index 
Control Countries—ICRG Indes 
Australia Dominican Republic Indonesia Paraguay United States* 
Bolivia Ecuador Iran Philippines* Uruguay 
Botswana El Salvador Latvia Russian Federation Venezuela 
Brazil Finland Malaysia Sri Lanka Yugoslavia 
Canada* France* Namibia Sweden*  
Chile Germany Netherlands* Switzerland  
Costa Rica Guyana New Zealand* Taiwan  
Cyprus Honduras Norway* Ukraine*  
Treated Countries Year Law 
Albania 1999 The Law on the Right to Information for Official Documents 
Argentina 2003 Access to Public Information Regulation 
Armenia 2003 Law on Freedom of Information  
Austria 1987 Federal Law on the Duty to Furnish Information 1 
Belgium 1994 Law on the right of access to administrative documents held by federal public authorities  
Bulgaria 2000 Access to Public Information Act  
Colombia 1985 Law Ordering the Publicity of Official Acts and Documents  
Croatia 2003 Act on the Right of Access to Information  
Czech Republic 1999 Law on Free Access to Information 
Denmark 1985 Access to Public Administration Files Act 
Estonia 2001 Public Information Act  
Greece 1999 Code of Administrative Procedure 1999 
Hungary 1992 Protection of Personal Data and Disclosure of Data of Public Interest  
Ireland 1997 Freedom of Information Act 
Israel 1998 Freedom of Information Law  
Italy 1990 No. 241 of 7 August 1990 
Jamaica 2002 Access to Information Act 
Japan 1999 Law Concerning Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs 
Korea, Rep. 1996 Act on Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies  
Lithuania 2000 Law on the Right to Obtain Information from State and Local Government Institutions  
Mexico 2002 Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Public Government Information  
Panama 2001 The Law on Transparency in Public Administration 
Peru 2003 The Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information 
Poland 2001 Law on Access to Public Information 
Portugal 1993 Law of Access to Administrative Documents  
Romania 2001 Law Regarding Free Access to Information of Public Interest  
Slovak Republic 2000 Act on Free Access to Information 
Slovenia 2003 Access to Public Information Act 
South Africa 2000 Promotion of Access to Information Act 
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Spain 1992 Law on Rules for Public Administration  
Thailand 1997 Official Information Act  
Trinidad and Tobago 1999 Freedom of Information Act 
Turkey 2003 Law on the Right to Information  
United Kingdom 2000 Freedom of Information Act  
 
Control—CPI Index 
Albania* Ecuador Latvia* Russian Federation 
Australia* El Salvador Macedonia Spain* 
Austria* Finland* Malaysia Sri Lanka 
Belgium* France* Mauritius Sweden* 
Bolivia Georgia* Namibia Switzerland 
Botswana Germany Netherlands* Taiwan 
Brazil Greece* New Zealand* Trinidad and Tobago* 
Canada* Guatemala Norway* Ukraine 
Chile Honduras Panama United States* 
Colombia* Hungary* Paraguay Uruguay 
Costa Rica Indonesia Philippines* Venezuela 
Denmark* Italy Portugal* Yugoslavia 
Dominican Republic    
    
Treated Year Law  
Argentina 2003 Access to Public Information Regulation 
Armenia 2003 Law on Freedom of Information  
Bulgaria 2000 Access to Public Information Act  
Croatia 2003 Act on the Right of Access to Information  
Czech Republic 1999 Law on Free Access to Information  
Estonia 2001 Public Information Act  
Ireland 1997 Freedom of Information Act 
Israel 1998 Freedom of Information Law  
Jamaica 2002 Access to Information Act 
Japan 1999 Law Concerning Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs 
Lithuania 2000 
Law on the Right to Obtain Information from State and Local Government 
Institutions  
Mexico 2002 Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Public Government Information  
Peru 2003 The Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information 
Poland 2001 Law on Access to Public Information 
Romania 2001 Law Regarding Free Access to Information of Public Interest  
Slovak Republic 2000 Act on Free Access to Information 
Slovenia 2003 Access to Public Information Act 
South Africa 2000 Promotion of Access to Information Act 
Thailand 1997 Official Information Act  
Turkey 2003 Law on the Right to Information  
United Kingdom 2000 Freedom of Information Act  
Note: * denotes that country already had FOI law.
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Appendix 2: Comparing Estimated Probability of Adopting FOI Law 
 Control Treatment Difference 
ICRG 0.469 0.503 -0.034 
 (0.095) (0.089) (0.022) 
 36 34  
    
CPI 0.276 0.289 -0.013 
 (0.053) (0.048) (0.013) 
 54 21  
Note: Control and Treatment columns present the mean of each estimated propensity score, or the probability of 
enacting FOI legislation conditional upon being in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Standard errors are below in 
parenthesis, followed by the number of observations. The column labeled Difference presents the differences of 
means. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
